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____________________________________ 
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Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 10, 2020) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Sharon Marie Smith challenges the denial of her application for Social Security 
disability benefits.  Although Smith makes several challenges to the ALJ’s decision, they 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 







all distill to a single point:  That decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  See 
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019).  We disagree and will affirm. 
Smith primarily argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr Rizvi’s 2014 Residual 
Functioning Capacity (RFC) assessment.  We disagree.  True, Dr. Rizvi found in 2014 
that Smith could sit, stand, and walk for a combined total of four hours and forty-five 
minutes per day, while the ALJ determined in 2016 that Smith could perform these 
activities for six hours per day.  But between Dr. Rizvi’s assessment and the ALJ’s 
determination, Smith had received chiropractic treatment that resulted in consistent and 
significant improvement to her condition.  Smith’s treatment records explain the ALJ’s 
deviation from Dr. Rizvi’s assessment and constitute substantial evidence supporting her 
RFC determination.1   
  Smith next argues that the ALJ improperly minimized her wrist, hand, and finger 
conditions.  But Dr. Rizvi’s own assessment fully supports the ALJ’s determination that 
these conditions were non-severe, and the ALJ limited Smith’s lifting and handling 
activities in the RFC determination.   
 Finally, Smith argues that the ALJ improperly discredited some of Smith’s 
testimony.  We cannot discern which specific portions of Smith’s testimony she believes 
the ALJ failed to address; Smith seems to simply disagree with the conclusions that the 
ALJ drew from the facts elicited in her testimony.  To the extent Smith contends that the 
 
1 Smith’s reliance on Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000), is 
misplaced:  The ALJ did not discount the 2014 RFCs based on conflicting reports by 






ALJ simply should have adopted her characterization of her symptoms as severe under 
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1999), we conclude that the treatment 
records supported the ALJ’s decision to discount that characterization.   
 We are sympathetic to Smith’s chronic pain and various ailments and express no 
opinion on whether we would have reached the same conclusion as the ALJ if our review 
were de novo.  In this posture, however, our review is limited to assessing whether the 
ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and for the reasons we have 
explained, it was.  We therefore will affirm.   
 
